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Abstract
This research developed kernel level rootkits for Android mobile devices
designed to avoid traditional detection methods. The rootkits use system call hooking to
insert new handler functions that remove the presence of infection data. The effectiveness
of the rootkit is measured with respect to its stealth against detection methods and
behavior performance benchmarks. Detection method testing confirms that while
detectable with proven tools, system call hooking detection is not built-in or currently
available in the Google Play Android App Store. Performance behavior benchmarking
showed that the new handler function inserted by the system call hooking affects the
average completion time of the targeted system calls. However, this delay’s magnitude
may not be noticeable by average users.
The covert Android rootkits implemented target the emulator available from the
Android Open Source Project (AOSP) and the Samsung Galaxy Nexus running Android
4.0. The rootkits are compiled against both Linux kernel 2.6 and 3.0, respectively. This
research shows the Android’s Linux kernel is vulnerable to system call hooking and
additional measures should be implemented before handling sensitive data with Android.
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COVERT ANDROID ROOTKIT DETECTION: EVALUATING LINUX KERNEL LEVEL ROOTKITS
ON THE ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEM

I. Introduction
1.1

Research Domain
Smartphones are mobile phones that offer more advanced features and computing

power than traditional cellular phones. Beyond simply making calls, a Smartphone can
carry multiple connections from cellular networks, wireless Bluetooth, the Internet (via
Wi-Fi), USB and other peripherals. With these new connections, smartphone users can
access email, social networks, and banking all from their mobile device. Information
security, then, becomes an immediate concern with sensitive data being handled on
potentially unsecure devices.
The Google Android operating system [Goo12] is currently the most widely used
platform for Smartphones and is on about a quarter of Tablet PC devices. The Android
operating system is a mobile device operating system for Smartphones and Tablet PCs
designed by Google and the Open Handset Alliance. The Android operating system stack
runs on top of the Linux kernel, typically, on a 32-bit mobile device ARM processor.
Since Android is built on top of the Linux kernel, it inherits the same vulnerabilities and
the possibility of exploitation by malware, backdoors, and rootkits to gain control of the
system or induce denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A rootkit is a set of programs and code
that allows a permanent or consistent, undetectable presence on an operating system.

1

With the Android’s widespread adoption, research in attacks may spark interest in
developing preventive security measures for Android. This research is particularly
interested with developing kernel level rootkits that remain undetected by currently
available detection methods on the Android operating system.

1.2

Problem Statement
Android dominance of the Smartphone market has made it an inevitable target of

malicious attacks. Malware for Android typically targets sensitive information like GPS
location, Short Message Service (SMS) billing, bank account credentials, premium phone
calls, e-mails, and social network credentials. Understanding how malware remains
undetected when it accesses to this information is advantageous to increased development
in detection and operating system security measures.
Kernel level rootkits run at the highest privilege by manipulating memory known
as kernel space. Malware developers insert rootkits into operating system by exploiting
software bugs. The Android operating system is no exception and old software
vulnerability attacks become new when targeting its Linux kernel.

1.3

Research Goals
Kernel level rootkits that remain undetected persist longer and increase the

capability of an attacker to exfiltrate data from the targeted device. Rootkit effectiveness,
then, can be determined by the detectability of the rootkit. Modern rootkits divert the
flow of execution at the kernel level to prevent infection detection. Understanding and
evaluating these techniques can lead to more effective detection measures. The goal of
2

this research is to determine the effectiveness of various covert techniques implemented
in kernel level rootkits on the Android operating system’s Linux kernel. The covert
techniques are based on traditional implementations of system call hooking used to hide
infection data. The rootkits are tested against available and proven detection techniques
and benchmarked for behavior performance analysis to determine the rootkit’s
effectiveness.

1.4

Document Outline
Chapter II introduces the Android operating system, conventional software

exploits, and taxonomy of rootkits. Chapter III presents the methodology for evaluating
the rootkits developed for this research. The rootkits are designed to evade the currently
available detection methods. Chapter IV presents the design and implementation of the
rootkits. The chapter also presents the results and analysis of the rootkits against
detection methods and the delay induced by the covert techniques. Chapter V highlights
the accomplishments of this research and proposes future research in both offensive and
defensive techniques against the Android operating system.

3

II. Literature Review
This chapter reviews kernel exploits and rootkit techniques that target the Linux
kernel component of the Android operating system. The first section introduces the focus
of this research, the Android operating system and its kernel. The second provides an
overview of exploits that obtain initial access to the Linux kernel. The third section
provides an overview of rootkits focusing on those whose objective is to remain
undetectable and persistent.

2.1

Introduction to Android
The Android operating system is a mobile device operating system for

smartphones and tablets designed by Google and the Open Handset Alliance. When
released in October 2008, Google also publically released the source code as the Android
Open Source Project (AOSP) under Apache’s open source license [Goo12]. This made
the code readily available for analysis and compilation. Android runs primarily on the
popular mobile device 32-bit processor, ARM. ARM is a RISC (Reduced Instruction Set
Computer) architecture which means that it uses simpler instructions compared to x86
processor’s CISC (Complicated Instruction Set Computer) architecture. However, the
operating system concepts for a Linux kernel running on ARM are the same. Android is
currently the best-selling smartphone platform worldwide. This widespread adoption has
led to increased targeting by malware writers.
2.1.1

The Android Software Stack
The Android “software stack” includes an operating system, middleware, and key

applications [God12]. The software stack is composed of five abstract layers shown in
4

Figure 2.1. From top to bottom the layers are Applications, Application Framework,
Android Runtime, Native Libraries, and the Linux Kernel. This section describes the
features from the top to the bottom layer.

Figure 2.1 The Android Software Stack

Android comes with a set of core applications that include an email client, Short
Message Service (SMS) program, calendar, maps, browser, and contacts. Other
applications can be downloaded from the Android Application Market or from a
Universal Serial Bus (USB) connected computer to a mobile device running Android.
Developers can take advantage of the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) and
design applications for public release. Applications developed in the Android SDK are
written in the Java programming language but can also be written in C/C++ using the
Native Developer Kit (NDK). Even though the applications are designed in Java, they run
in a Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) rather than the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) in PC
environments. The Android application framework promotes efficiency and security with
5

its DVM application sandboxing and permission model interfaces that provide access to
the lower layers.
The Android application framework sits above the system libraries, core libraries,
and DVM. Since Android is an open development platform, developers can build
extremely rich and innovative applications. Through the application framework,
developers can utilize device hardware, access location information, run background
services, set alarms, add notifications to the status bar, and much more. The application
architecture is also designed to simplify the reuse and replacement components of
applications securely. All applications have access to a set of services and systems that
includes a rich and extensible set of Views, Content Providers, a Resource Manager, a
Notification Manager, and an Activity Manager.
The Android Runtime layer is above the system libraries and kernel providing the
DVM and core libraries. DVM is specifically designed for embedded environments such
as mobile devices, tablet computers, and netbooks to support application portability and
runtime consistency. With these features in mind, Dalvik supports multiple virtual
machine processes (i.e., instances) per device and ensures runtime memory is used
efficiently. Android runs every application in its own DVM instance. The virtual machine
has a registered-based architecture that runs classes compiled by a Java language
compiler. These classes are transformed into the optimized .dex (Dalvik Executable) file
format to be more compact and memory efficient than Java class files. Java code can also
be reused by converting Java .class and .jar files to .dex files at build time. The core
libraries are written in Java and provide a substantial subset of the Java 5 SE packages as
well as some Android-specific libraries. These libraries access the capabilities provided
6

by the hardware (storage, network access), operating system (utilities), and native
libraries (data structures).
The next layer in the Android software stack includes a collection of native
libraries implemented in C/C++ used by various components. The capabilities derived
from these libraries are available to developers through the Android application
framework. These libraries include the System C library, media libraries, Surface
Manager, LibWebCore, SGL, 3D libraries, FreeType, and SQLite.
Lastly, the Linux kernel layer acts as an abstraction layer between the hardware
and the rest of the software stack. The kernel handles system services such as security,
memory management, process management, network stack, and driver model. The
components of the Linux kernel include display driver, camera driver, flash memory
drive, binder (ipc) driver, keypad driver, Wi-Fi driver, audio drivers, and power
management. The Linux kernel supports programs written in the C programming
language. Since Android is built on top of the Linux kernel, it inherits its vulnerabilities
and the possibility of exploitation by malware, backdoors, and rootkits to gain control of
the system or cause denial of service.
2.1.2

Summary
This section gives a brief overview of the Android operating system structure and

features. The abstraction of the platform’s kernel from the end-user is both an advantage
from a usability standpoint and a disadvantage from a security awareness standpoint
[Pap10]. Executing code below the application framework layer discreetly can easily and
completely subvert a user. If this execution is malicious, attackers can perform malicious
activities such as exfiltrate sensitive or personal data without detection. Exploiting
7

software vulnerabilities allow attackers to install tools to perform malicious activity. The
following section discusses these vulnerabilities and exploitation of Android’s Linux
kernel.

2.2

Software Exploitation in the Linux Kernel
Vulnerabilities in software are often due to programming errors known as bugs.

Bugs are defined as a malfunction in a program that makes the program produce incorrect
results, behave in an undesired way, or simply crash [Per10]. Security issues arise from
vulnerabilities that are exploited. Exploits that can be reused on similar vulnerabilities
can be generalized into vulnerability classes. Classes discussed in the following sections
include uninitialized pointer dereferences, memory corruption vulnerabilities, integer
overflows, and race conditions.
2.2.1

Uninitialized Pointer Dereferences
A pointer is a variable that holds the address of another variable in memory.

When dereferencing a point, the object pointed to is accessed. Static, uninitialized
pointers will always contain a NULL (0x0) value and a NULL return value indicates a
failure in memory allocation. NULL pointer dereferences occur when a kernel path
dereferences a NULL pointer causing a kernel panic. The kernel will try to use the
memory address 0x0 which usually is not mapped. Exploitation can occur when an
attacker can predict or force a pointer dereference to an uninitialized, unvalidated, or
corrupted pointer resulting in a read or write to an arbitrary location by the kernel [Per10]
[Sqr07].

8

2.2.2

Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities
Memory corruption vulnerabilities classes include cases in which kernel memory

is corrupted as a consequence of poorly written code that overwrites the kernel’s
contents. Kernel memory consists of the kernel stack and the kernel heap [Per10]. The
kernel stack is associated with each process whenever it runs at the kernel level. The
kernel heap is used each time a kernel needs to allocate memory. The fundamentals of
exploiting these structures translate to the user space as buffer overflows. Buffer
overflows are explained below to introduce kernel memory exploitation.
Buffer overflow exploits are a common avenue for an attacker to gain access and
control of a machine. The vulnerability is typically exploited by sending more data to a
program than the developer intended [How09]. The memory a program uses to store
instances of the same data type is known as a buffer which stores things like character
arrays or strings. Strings are primarily used for input and output to the user. The structure
of how this data is handled in a program must be understood to take advantage of a buffer
overflow.
A program process is organized into three memory sections: text, data, and stack
[Ale96]. The text section is fixed by the program and includes code and read-only data.
As this section contains executable code, it normally has read-only permissions; attempts
to write to this section will result in a memory segmentation fault. The data section
contains initialized and uninitialized data. Data variables for the program are stored here.
This section corresponds to the data-bss section of the executable file. While these two
sections are important to executing a program, the stack section is the target of a buffer
overflow.
9

The stack section is where dynamic data is stored. It is used for local variables, to
pass parameter values, and to return values from functions and procedures. The stack
section is a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) data structure which means that elements are added
or removed from only one end or top of the structure. The stack grows into the higher
memory addresses as elements are added. If the data and stack section grow into each
other, the process is blocked and run again with more memory allocated.
A pointer to the top of the stack in memory is stored in a CPU register called the
stack pointer (SP). The stack consists of logical stack frames that are allocated when
calling a function and unallocated when returning. The base of the current stack frame is
pointed to by the stack frame pointer (FP). When a function is called, the previous FP is
pushed (i.e., saved) onto the stack. The SP is copied into the FP to allocate the new frame
and the SP is incremented to allocate space for local variables. These actions are called
the prolog of the function while the actions of a returning function are called an epilog.
At the epilog, the actions of the prolog must be “reversed” and cleaned up. An attacker
can develop an exploit with a process’ stack structure via buffer overflows.

Figure 2.2 Program Stack

Consider a vulnerable program stack as shown in Figure 2.2. The variable bufferX
has 8 bytes allocated and the saved frame pointer and return pointer have 4 bytes
10

allocated, respectively. If bufferX is controlled by user input and the bounds of the buffer
are not checked within the program, a malicious user could exploit this. To test for buffer
overflow vulnerabilities, the user may enter a large amount of input. Based on the
example presented earlier, this will change the memory state from Table 2.1 to Table 2.2
supposing the user entered hexadecimal A’s.
Table 2.1 The Initial State of Memory
Address
Data

bufferX
0x00 – 0x07
0x0

Saved Frame PTR
0x08 – 0x0B
0x1234

Return PTR
0xC – 0x0F
0x600D

Table 2.2 The Post State of Testing Memory
Address
Data

bufferX
0x00 – 0x07
AAAA AAAA

Saved Frame PTR
0x08 – 0x0B
AAAA

Return PTR
0xC – 0x0F
AAAA

A segmentation fault will occur but the user now knows a buffer overflow is
present. Therefore, the user will probe the program until the location of the return pointer
is located. The objective of this exploit is for the malicious user to run shellcode [Sko06].
Suppose it is determined that the return pointer starts 12 bytes from buffer; the process
can be forced to return to an address where desired malicious code resides by overwriting
the 4 bytes after that. If the input from Table 2.3 is entered the instruction pointer will
point to the malicious code in bufferX and the malicious user has successfully
compromised the program and the machine running it.
Table 2.3 Exploiting Memory
Address
Data

bufferX
0x00 – 0x07
/bin/sh

Saved Frame PTR
0x08 – 0x0B
SSSS
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Return PTR
0xC – 0x0F
0x00

The heap data structure can also be targeted by a malicious user if the buffer
bounds are not properly checked when memory is allocated. These exploits are known as
heap overflows. As in buffer overflow, heap overflow can allow an attacker to redirect
the flow of program execution or change other variables in vulnerable programs. The
buffer overflow example is simplified but the same technique is applied to stack and heap
structures. This technique can be leveraged by attackers to run shell code and gain access
from remote machines, exfiltrate information, or install software such as rootkits.
2.2.3

Integer Overflows
Integer overflow occurs when the value of an integer is increased beyond the

maximum value it can represent given the number of bytes allocated. The result can
include ignoring the overflow or aborting the program. However, most compilers store
the incorrect value and continue executing causing sometimes disastrous and unexpected
results.
Integers are typically the same size as a pointer on the system they are compiled
on. The Android operating system runs on 32-bit ARM processors therefore the pointers
and the integers will be 32-bit. Suppose a program sets an unsigned short integer variable
x to its maximum value of 65,535 (represented in hexadecimal as 0xffffffff). Suppose the
program is overwritten so that it will add 1 to x until it reaches 70,000 where it will
terminate. The program will actually never terminate. If overflow is ignored when 1 is
added to 65,535, the result is truncated to a size that can be stored into the 32-bit length
of x, in this case is 0x00000000. Thus, the program will continue in an infinite loop.
Signed integers also have this problem because the range for a 32-bit signed integer is
from –32,768 to 32,767. When 1 is added to 32,767, the result is –32,768. Integer
12

overflow affecting the sign of the value is classified as a signedness bug. These examples
are clearly programming errors and cannot be exploited by a malicious user. If, however,
there was user input and a more complex control structure, a malicious user could alter
the execution flow by entering input targeting the integer overflow and thereby exploit
the program.
Frequent targets of integer overflow exploits include network daemons and
operating system kernels. However, all integer overflows are not exploitable because
memory is not being directly overwritten [Ble02]. They do not allow direct execution
flow control but the subtle effect of an erroneous value can lead to problems later in the
code which may enable the exploitation of bugs such as buffer or heap overflows
[How09]. Although, integer overflows may not cause direct compromise of an
application, the application will not detect that a calculation was performed incorrectly
and will continue to execute. The unexpected behavior of the application continuing after
an integer overflow introduces a vulnerability into the system.
2.2.4

Race Conditions
A race condition occurs when two actors (i.e., processes or threads) compete

within the same time interval for the same resource. The integrity of the resulting data or
the correctness of computing tasks may be affected. Race conditions primarily occur in
operating systems but can also occur in multithreaded or cooperating processes [Pfl11].
The type of system can complicate exploiting a race condition. Symmetric
multiprocessing (SMP) systems are easier to exploit because multiple kernel paths can be
concurrently executing on multiple processors increasing the likelihood of a kernel race
condition. On uniprocessor (UP) systems, however, it is more difficult to set up a
13

situation where race condition will occur. For example, suppose two kernel tasks with a
possible race condition are concurrently executing on an UP system. The first task must
somehow be preempted. The scheduler then must be forced into selecting the second
‘racing’ thread. Finally, the race condition is exploited if the second task modifies the
same kernel memory as the first. Race conditions can be prevented using synchronization
primitives (e.g., locks, semaphores, conditional variables, or monitors) but these reduce
performance and often induce deadlocks in a system [Per10].
A race condition is possible at a relatively high level in Linux using files and
other objects [How09]. Suppose an application needs to create a temporary file. It first
checks to see if the file already exists and if not the application creates the file. An
attacker deduces the naming scheme of the temporary file and creates a link back to a file
of the attacker’s choice. If the temporary file’s suid bit is set to root, the file executes as
root causing a privilege escalation for the attacker. Thus, this race condition causes a
privilege escalation.
2.2.5

Summary
This section reviewed software exploitation of a Linux kernel. There are

protection technologies built to defend against these exploits but attacks continue to
overcome these protection mechanisms. The following section discusses how rootkits
avoid detection and maintain persistence within a compromised system.

2.3

Introduction to Rootkits
Suppose a user with malicious intent has an exploit for an Android phone. The

exploit runs shellcode but the delivery mechanism may be detected. Therefore, the
14

attacker wants to deliver one payload that maintains access and is not detectable by the
end user or an administrator. A backdoor that bypasses authentication mechanisms is a
good solution, but it is not the best because backdoors are noisy and detectable by an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The best solution to avoid detection would be a
rootkit. A rootkit allows an attacker to permanently or consistently maintain undetectable
access to the root, that is, the most powerful user on a system. Rootkits can enable an
attacker to install a backdoor to remote control a compromised system and exfiltrate
information.
Rootkits are typically organized into two classes, user level and kernel level. A
typical user level rootkit is designed to gain full control of the memory space of a
targeted application, while kernel level rootkits run at the highest privilege by controlling
the memory known as kernel space. This section explains the techniques used in these
classes of rootkits.
2.3.1

User Level Rootkits
User level rootkits are unprivileged and are stored outside of kernel memory

space. They are user space code that patches or replaces existing applications to provide
cover for malicious activities. User level rootkits replace system binaries, add malicious
utilities, change configuration files, delete files, or launch malicious processes [Gri06].
For example, the Linux system program ‘ls’ could be changed so as to not reveal the
presence of a malicious file in a directory. These rootkits, while effective, are easily
detected by file system integrity and signature checking tools [Dav08], therefore, most
modern IDS software prevent these rootkits from being installed or can detect an active
intruder.
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2.3.2

Kernel Level Rootkits
Kernel level rootkits defeat such tools by directly modifying the operating system

kernel. These rootkits modify the execution flow of kernel code to run their own payload.
However, modifying the kernel in this way can drastically affect the stability of the
system causing a kernel panic.
The simplest way to introduce code into a running kernel is through a Loadable
Kernel Module (LKM) [Kon07]. LKMs add flexibility to an operating system by
providing a means to add functionality without recompiling the entire kernel. Added
functionality might include device drivers, filesystem drivers, system calls, network
drivers, TTY line disciplines, and executable interpreters [Hen06]. Most modern UNIXlike systems, including Solaris, Linux, and FreeBSD, use or support LKMs [Zov01].
However, the kernel packaged with Android does not support LKMs by default. The
kernel can be recompiled and installed on Android to add LKM support if physical access
to the mobile is available. LKMs are very useful, but they also allow maliciously written
kernel modules to subvert the entire operating system which can lead to a loss of control
of the Linux kernel and consequently all the layers above the kernel [Pap10]. Kernel level
rootkits typically subvert the kernel to hide processes, modules, connections and more to
avoid detection. Particular techniques include hooking system calls, direct kernel object
manipulation (DKOM), run-time kernel memory patching, interrupt descriptor table
hooking, and intercepting calls handled by Virtual File System (VFS). These techniques
are discussed at a high level in this section.
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2.3.2.1 Hooking System Calls
The kernel provides a set ooff interfaces or system calls by which processes running
in user space can interact with the system. The applications in user space send requests
through this interface and the kernel fulfills requests or returns an error. The execution
flow of a system calll can be seen in Figure 2.3 [Bov05] [Lov10].. A process invokes a
system call to jump from user space to the assembly language function called the system
call handler in kernel space. The system call number passes from the wrapper routine to
the handler function
ction via the EAX register. The system call table calls the appropriate
system call service routine location based on the number passed and returns a number
indicating success or error. Not allowing user space applications to access or run in
kernel space provides stability and security to the entire operating system. This
arbitration prevents applications from incorrectly using hardware, stealing other
processes’ resources, or otherwise doing harm to the system inadvertently or otherwise.
Even so, system calls
alls can be hooked to exploit the power of the kernel.

Figure 2.
2.3 Normal System Call [Bov05] [Lov10]

Hooking is a technique tha
thatt employs handler function, called hooks, to modify
control flow [Kon07].. A new hook registers its address as the location for a specific
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function, so when that function is called the hook runs instead. Typically, a hook will call
the original function at some point to preserve the original behavior. System calls can be
hooked using a maliciously designed LKM to alter the structure of the system call table.
To hook the system call table, the original targeted system call pointer to the
function must be saved. The original system call is also called to preserve
rve the original
behavior because the objective of a hooked call is to modify the I/O of the function, not
destroy it. A pointer to the hooked system call handler, typically located in the LKM, is
saved in the system call table location of the target. At aany
ny point the target system call is
made, it will move through the hooked system call handler providing a system-wide
system
hook
stored in kernel space. Figure 2.
2.4 [Bov05] [Lov10] shows the inserted hooked system call
and how it maintainss the execution flow by calling the proper system call service routine.
The hooked system call returns control to user space after completion.

Figure 2.
2.4 Hooked System Call [Bov05] [Lov10]

2.3.2.2 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
Hooking the system write call allows a rootkit to hide from system binaries like
ls, lsmod, and ps; even so, robust IDSs can still detect the existence by following the
kernel structures. All operating sy
systems store internal record-keeping
keeping data in main
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memory [Kon07]. The Linux kernel is no exception and provides generic data structures
and primitives to encourage code reuse by developers [Bov05]. These structures, that all
programmers are familiar with, include linked lists, queues, maps, and binary trees.
Altering the data in these structures to hide an attacker’s activity is called Direct Kernel
Object Manipulation (DKOM)
For example, the Linux kernel contains a process list that links together all
existing process descriptors in a doubly linked list. Each process is contained in a
task_struct structure as in Figure 2.5 [But04]. The task_struct contains the pointers to the
prev_task and next_task. Removing the malicious process from the list of prev_task and
next_task will hide the malicious process from the system as shown in Figure 2.6
[But04]. This technique can change depending on the kernel version but the technique is
essentially the same in each implementation.

Figure 2.5 Normal Kernel Object Linking [But04]

19

Figure 2.6 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation [But04]

2.3.2.3 Run-Time Kernel Memory Patching
The classic and arguably easiest way to introduce code into the Linux kernel is
through a LKM. Another technique patches a running kernel with user space code, also
known as Run-Time Kernel Memory Patching (RKP) [Kon07][Pra99]. Interacting with
/dev/kmem device allows reading and writing to kernel virtual memory. Note that root
permissions must be present. RKP has been used to install LKMs without LKM support
[Ces98] and cloak system call hooks [Sdd01].
2.3.2.4 Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooking
An interrupt is an event that alters the sequence of instructions executed by the
processor. When an interrupt occurs a system table called the Interrupt Descriptor Table
(IDT) associates each interrupt or exception with the address of the corresponding
handler [Bov05]. System calls use software interrupts to switch from user mode to kernel
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mode. The interrupt handler invokes the system call handler from the address stored in
the system call table. A rootkit can hook the IDT by modifying the interrupt handler
address in the IDT or by patching the first few instructions of the interrupt handler
[Sha08]. These modifications would put the rootkit code in the flow of execution while
still letting the system handle interrupts properly [Kad02].
2.3.2.5 Intercepting Calls Handled by VFS
The virtual file system (VFS) can also be targeted to compromise the kernel and
hide the attacker’s presence. The VFS is a software layer in the Linux kernel that handles
all system calls related to the standard UNIX file system. VFS can handle several
different types of file systems [Lev06]. The adore-ng kernel-level rootkit targets the VFS
by replacing the VFS handler routines with its own routines. These handler routines
provide directory listings to /proc file systems. Therefore, modifying these handles can
hide specified files and processes from the user mode programs.
2.3.3

Firmware Level Rootkits
Firmware-based rootkits (also known as bootkits) can ensure persistence against

removal. A firmware-based rootkit hides by modifying the software on devices such as
the Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) BIOS and Peripheral
Component Interconnect (PCI) BIOS. The firmware is modified to contain malicious
ACPI Machine Language (AML) instructions that interact with system memory and the
I/O space thereby allowing the rootkit to bootstrap code that overwrites kernel memory as
a means of infection [Hea06]. Although an effective technique, firmware rootkits are
easily detected by Trusted Computing Group’s Trusted Platform Module (TPM). TPM
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checks the integrity of the operating system image and firmware and is in widespread use
today [Dav08].
2.3.4

Virtual Machine Based Rootkits (VMBR)
Rootkit activity can be also hidden using a Virtual Machine Based Rootkit

(VMBR). VMBR
MBR operates without modifying anything on the system while monitoring
an operating system’s activity. Therefore, any IDS integrity checks will not detect any
presence of a rootkit because it is actually handling the virtualization of the entire
operating system. VMBRs can be either software or hardware based.
2.3.4.1 Software Virtual Machine Based Rootkit
Software VMBRs virtualize the target operating system by executing the rootkit
within a separate operating system hosting a virtual machine monitor (VMM). Figure 2.7
shows how the subverted system is stacked after a software VMBR is installed. The
rootkit code remains hidden from the subverted operating system because it executes in a
separate operating system context [Kim08]. µBeR,
BeR, a proof of concept VMBR rootkit,
uses this technique by installing a microkernel to subvert the Android operating system to
provide malicious services [[Tri10].. Although the microkernel has a small footprint, the
rootkit induces performance overhead which can be detected based on discrepancies
between virtual and physical hardware [Dav08].

Figure 2.
2.7 Software Virtual Machine Based Rootkit
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2.3.4.2 Hardware Virtual Machine Based Rootkits
Hardware VMBRs are a specialized rootkit that uses specific instruction sets to
switch contexts between VMM and the guest operating system. The rootkit virtualizes an
operating system by gaining root access and installing the rootkit hypervisor. It carves out
memory for the hypervisor and migrates the running operating system into a virtual
machine. The rootkit then intercepts access to hypervisor memory and selected hardware
devices. Figure 2.8 illustrates the structure of the system after the hypervisor is installed
[Zov06]. Hardware VMBRs are specialized because they only target specific
technologies such as AMD SVM (Bluepill) and Intel VT (Vitriol) processors [Rut06]
[Zov06]. Hardware VMBRs are detectable because hypervisors must use cache, memory
bandwidth, and TLB entries in the course of multiplexing a CPU. A guest operating
system can be made intentionally sensitive to these resources to detect an attempted
hypervisor install [Kim08].

Figure 2.8 Hardware Virtual Machine Based Rootkit [Zov06]

2.3.5

Summary
This section provides a taxonomy of rootkits and an overview of techniques that

can be employed by a kernel level rootkit in Linux. The rootkits described include user
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level rootkits, kernel level rootkits, firmware level rootkits, and virtual machine based
rootkits. The kernel level rootkit techniques covered include hooking system calls, direct
kernel object manipulation (DKOM), run-time kernel memory patching, interrupt
descriptor table (IDT) hooking, and intercepting calls handled by the virtual file system
(VFS). This section reviews the attack target, initial compromise through exploits, and
maintaining persistence and stealth within the Linux kernel with rootkits.
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III. Methodology
3.1

Background
The Android operating system is a mobile device operating system for

Smartphones and Tablet PCs designed by Google and the Open Handset Alliance. The
code is open source licensed and available under the Android Open Source Project
(AOSP) [Goo12]. Releasing the code under open source license makes it readily
available for analysis and compilation. The Android operating system stack runs on top
of the Linux kernel typically on the 32-bit mobile device ARM processor. Since Android
is built on top of the Linux kernel, it inherits its vulnerabilities and the possibility of
exploitation by malware, backdoors, and rootkits to gain control of the system or induce
denial of service (DoS). Widespread adoption of Android has led to increased targeting
by malware writers. Android attacks have naturally sparked interest in researching
protections for Android. This research is particularly interested in developing kernel level
rootkits; a set of tools consisting of small programs that allow an attacker to permanently
or reliably maintain undetectable access to the root user, that is, the most powerful user
on a system. Kernel level rootkits run at the highest privilege by manipulating memory
known as kernel space. Attackers insert rootkits into operating system by exploiting
software bugs. This research examines the detectability of system call hooking rootkits
for the Android operating system by examining subversion techniques inherited from the
underlying Linux kernel. The rootkit’s detectability is measured against currently
available security mechanisms and anomaly detection methods.
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3.2

Problem Definition
This section describes the specific goals of the research along with the research

hypothesis. The approach describes how the hypothesis is tested against the research
goal.
3.2.1

Goals and Hypothesis
The goal of this research is to determine the effectiveness of traditional system

call hooking techniques implemented by a kernel level rootkit against the Android
operating system. The effectiveness of the rootkit is measured with respect to its stealth
against currently available security mechanisms and anomaly detection methods.
The hypothesis of this research is that the Android’s Linux kernel cannot be
trusted and additional measures should be implemented before handling sensitive data
with Android. The rootkit is expected to be effective without the end user noticing,
thereby preventing any indication of infection.
3.2.2

Approach
Rootkits maintain access to a system by hiding their presence from the end user.

An administrator may use the conventional Linux tools to look for suspicious files,
processes, modules, or ports. These tools include ls, netstat, ps, and lsmod, respectively.
The cat command is also used to probe files containing system information. A rootkit
designed to hide from these commands would then be an effective way to remain
undetected by an end user or administrator. Modifying the behavior of these tools’
processes can be done by hooking system call functions with code at the kernel level to
remove signs of an access breach or infection.
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The most straightforward way to introduce code into the kernel is by using a
loadable module in Linux. The operating system allows these extensions to be loaded so
manufacturers of third party hardware can add support for their products. Therefore, any
code can be loaded into kernel space via a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM). Code
running at the kernel level has full access to all privileged memory of the kernel and
system processes. This research leverages LKMs to introduce covert techniques by
hooking system calls to control the Linux kernel component of the Android operating
system.
The effectiveness of each rootkit is evaluated against rootkit detection methods on
both an emulator and device. These detection methods are probe-based, integrity-based,
behavior-based, heuristic-based, and signature-based. Each method’s implementation is
discussed in detail in Appendix A.

3.3

System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Covert Android Rootkit Detection System

(CARDS). CARDS includes the Android mobile device, the Android operating system
(OS), an Android LKM rootkit, and the infection data hidden by the covert techniques.
The Android operating system platform is built for the ARM processor architecture. No
other operating system or processors are considered. The SUT does not initially include
any Android applications that provide system protection. The workload is the covert
techniques employed by the LKM rootkit and the detection methods used against the
rootkit.
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The Component Under Test (CUT) is the LKM rootkit inserted into the Android
operating system on the emulator or device. Figure 3.1 shows CARDS complete with
input, outputs, and internal components.

Figure 3.1 Covert Android Rootkit Detection System (CARDS)

3.4

System Services
The service that CARDS provides is stealth from detection methods. Since the

rootkit is hiding from both the operating system and user, no functionality or service
should be restricted in any way unless it is an outcome of the subversion. For example,
the command netstat will not print out information about port 31337 because it is
required to provide a backdoor to the operating system and end user. The rootkit should
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not cause denial of service such as loss of network communications, application crashes,
or operating system crashes.
CARDS stealth service has two outcomes: the rootkit is detected or is undetected
on the device. The desired outcome for the stealth service is to be undetected, but even if
it is, functionality degradation can prompt a user to wipe the devices internal memory
which will result in the removal of the rootkit and infection data. Therefore, the
performance latency of an infection is evaluated with the behavioral-based detection
method to account for possible functionality degradation.

3.5

Workload
The workload is the rootkit employing varying system call hooks to achieve

covert operations and the detection methods used to detect an infection or anomalies.
Detection methods use system commands, forensics tools, and Android applications.
System commands include Linux system binaries used by administrators to determine a
rootkit’s presence. The forensics tools are open source programs compiled for the ARM
processor. The Android application is publicly available in the Google Play Store. The
end user initializes system commands, forensics tools, and Android applications;
however, some tools are automated using scripts for streamlining data collection.
Each workload specified has separate parameters. The different covert techniques
are employed interchangeably by the LKM rootkit. The Android applications, the system
commands and forensic tools are included in the detection methods workload. Varying
the workload will determine the stealth effectiveness against the detection methods.
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3.6

Performance Metrics
The first metric is a binary response of detection methods. Successful scan

detection is classified by a “yes” and an unsuccessful scan is classified by a “no”. This
metric determines if the rootkit remains undetectable against probe-based, signaturebased, integrity-based, and heuristic-based detection methods. The covert technique
performance is best when it is not detected by any method.
The second metric, latencies, compares the measured time for an uninfected or
clean system call execution with an infected system call execution. The system calls
measured are unique to each rootkit. System call hooking can potentially add delay to the
time for a system call to be completed because the additional code added by the LKM is
executed before returning to user space. This delay may alert the presence of a rootkit to
the end user or a system administrator. The measurement of this metric is the difference
between the beginning and the end of the system call.

3.7

System Parameters
The parameters listed below affect the performance of the rootkit:
Device Type – The device type specifies the particular mobile device platform
being tested. The device determines the targeted operating system configuration
and therefore the techniques that can be employed by the rootkit. This research
uses an emulator from AOSP and GSM Samsung Galaxy Nexus (GN).
Operating System (OS) – The operating system determines the kernel that the
LKM rootkit can be compiled against. The operating system version used in this
research is Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich).
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Kernel Version – The kernel version changes how the rootkit covert techniques
are implemented. The emulator uses Linux kernel 2.6 and GN uses Linux kernel
3.0.
Central Processing Unit (CPU) – The processor determines how fast the system
can execute instructions in which how the operating system performs. The rootkit
may become more detectable if the processor cannot handle the overhead of the
rootkit. The emulator has an ARMEABI-v7A ARM Cortex-A8 processor and the
GN has a 1.2 GHz TI OMAP 4460 ARM Cortex-A9 dual-core processor.
Onboard Random-Access Memory (RAM) – The RAM available determines how
quickly the operating system can read and write to memory thus affecting overall
performance. After a power cycle, RAM is wiped and the operating system is
reloaded at boot. Consequently, the LKM rootkit will also be wiped at this time.
The emulator has a 1024MB allocated RAM and the GN has 1GB of onboard
RAM.
Onboard Storage Space – The storage space available in the system determines
how much data and programs can be loaded on the device at a time. More
executable code can be loaded with higher capacities. The emulator has a 496MB
storage and 4GB SD card allocated and the GN has 16GB of onboard storage.
Network Connections – Network connections allow the phone to communicate
with other devices and can be leveraged by the rootkit for remote command and
control or to exfiltrate data. The emulator has only an Internet network connection
shared from the host machine. The network connections the GN has are GSM
850/900/1800/1900 MHz, HSPDA 850/1700/1900/2100 MHz, and Wi-Fi: IEEE
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802.11 a/b/g/n (2.4/5 GHz). The netstat command can be used to view the open
ports; the rootkit hides its open connection.
CPU Scheduler – The CPU scheduler allocates CPU time efficiently while
providing responsive user feedback. By allocating CPU time to a process, the
current running process is preempted until it runs again by the scheduler.
Preemption can lead to artificial execution completion delays in performance.
Installed Applications – Installed applications indicate the type of data that may
be covertly exfiltrated from the target. Default applications on Android 4.0
include: Browser, Calculator, Calendar, Camera, Clock, Email, Gallery,
Messaging, Movie Studio, Music, People, Phone, Search, Settings, and Voice
Dialer.
System Commands – These programs are installed with the kernel and can be
used over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) command line. These tools are in the
directory /system/bin and are included in the PATH environment variable by
default. Commands typically loaded on a Linux device can also be used by
compiling compatible open source code for ARM. These missing programs are
included in the side-loaded BusyBox toolkit.

3.8

Factors
The following experimental factors are used at the indicated levels. Table 3.1

contains all the factors and levels.
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Table 3.1 Experimental Factors
Factors

Levels
hide_file
hide_proc
hide_mod
hide_port
Emulator
Device
Probe
Integrity
Signature
Heuristic
Behavioral

Covert Techniques

Platforms

Detection Methods

•

Covert Techniques
o hide_file – a technique that hooks system calls to hide files that contain a
specified magic string. The rootkit is designed to completely hide the
specified file from the command ls and cat.
o hide_proc – a technique that hooks system calls to hide running processes
that contain a specified magic string. The rootkit is designed to completely
hide the specified running process from the command ps, ls /proc, and kill.
o hide_mod – a technique that hooks system calls to hide modules that
contain a specified magic string. The rootkit completely hides such
modules from the command lsmod, cat /proc/modules, and rmmod.
o hide_port – a technique that hooks system calls to hide a specified open
port from the command netstat and cat /proc/net/tcp6.

•

Platforms
o Emulator – a virtual mobile device that runs a full Android system
stack on a computer. The emulator allows a simulation of how the
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rootkits are expected to perform. The emulator is compiled with
AOSP and runs the codenamed Goldfish Linux kernel.
o Device – a physical mobile device compatible with the Android
OS. The device allows a real world performance analysis for the
rootkits. The device is the Samsung Galaxy Nexus and runs the
codenamed Maguro Linux kernel.
•

Detection Methods
o Probe – Rootkit detection using the system commands to find an
unusual presence of a file, open port, process, or module. This
method is the base detection method that all the covert techniques
implemented should circumvent.
o Integrity – Rootkit detection by comparing files and memory with
a trusted source. An example of a trusted source is a baseline
system or a previous snapshot of the files and memory.
o Signature – Android applications installed on a mobile device to
scan for signatures of known malware. The rootkits implemented
are not expected to be detected because they have not been
publicly released.
o Heuristic – Rootkit detection by recognizing any deviations in a
computer’s expected output.
o Behavioral – Rootkit detection by deducing a rootkit infection by
monitoring normal system execution to identify anomalies in
performance.
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3.9

Evaluation Technique
A combination of simulation and measurement is used to evaluate the system.

Each rootkit's objective functionality is validated by the probe-based detection and then
tested against the test harness that includes the signature, integrity, and heuristic detection
methods. Performance latencies are measured via system call completion times using the
strace command. The completion times are measured 5 times before and after infection
for a total of 10 measurements for each system call hooked by the rootkit. Repeating
capture of system call completion times 5 times was determined to be sufficient to
distinguish a difference between the uninfected and infected state. The evaluation is
performed on the emulator and then performed on the mobile device to show real-world
performance.
This evaluation is performed on both the emulator and a mobile device loaded
with Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich (ICS). A Dell Latitude E6510 laptop is used to
compile code, run the emulator, and communicate via ADB. AOSP provides an emulator
for the Android environment [Goo12]. The mobile device tested is an unlocked GSMversion of Samsung Galaxy Nexus, which is one of few phones recommended for
building Android from AOSP [Goo12]. The kernel is configured to enable LKM
installation and loaded to the emulator and device via ADB. Tools installed on to
Android include: BusyBox [Vla12], unhide-tcp [Lin12], skdet [Gev12], Lookout Security
& Antivirus [Loo12], and strace v4.5.18 [Kra12]. Scripts used to automate testing are
included in Appendix A.
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3.10

Experimental Design
A full factorial design is used to evaluate the interaction between the factors. The

factors include covert techniques employed by each rootkit, platforms used for
evaluation, and detection methods, with 4, 2, and 5 levels, respectively. This results in 4 x
2 x 5 = 40 experiments. Each experiment is run until the output can be determined. The
kernel versions, CPU, onboard RAM, onboard storage, network connections depend on
the device type. The operating system, CPU scheduler, installed applications and system
commands are consistent throughout all the experiments while factors vary.
The variance in the results in this research should be low or zero because the
results directly depend on a successful detection and the latency of repeated system call
code. The latency of the system calls will be reported with 95% confidence. System
overhead is expected to be higher for most of the system calls infected by each rootkit.

3.11

Methodology Summary
As mobile devices become more widespread, they continue to become targets for

malicious attackers. Unfortunately, mobile operating systems have inherited the same
vulnerabilities as their PC counterparts. This chapter describes the methodology for
evaluating the detectability of a kernel level rootkit against the Google Android operating
system on an emulator and Samsung Galaxy Nexus. The goal of the research is to
determine whether a novel kernel level rootkit is undetectable to current security
mechanisms.
The SUT and CUT are identified along with accompanying parameters. Factors
are selected from the system and workload parameters. The methodology tests these
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factors during experimentation to produce results to determine the effectiveness of the
rootkit. The metrics used for evaluation are detectability and system call latencies.
The methodology consists of both simulation and measurement evaluations.
AOSP supplies an emulator to use for simulations and Samsung Galaxy Nexus connected
to a Dell Latitude E6510 laptop is used for the measurement evaluations. A full factorial
design is implemented with 40 experiments.
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IV. Covert Android Rootkit Detection Experimentation Results
4.1

Introduction
This chapter presents the covert techniques that utilize system call hooking

implemented in the tested rootkits. The evaluation technique used to determine the
effectiveness of the rootkits is presented. Finally, the results for detection method testing
and behavior latency benchmarking for covert technique rootkits are reported.

4.2

Rootkit Technical Design and Implementations
The Android operating system is fundamentally an application framework built on

top of a Linux kernel. The applications that execute within the framework are written in
Java and run in individual Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) instances [God12]. However,
the system below that framework is written in a combination of C/C++, therefore C
executables can be compiled and executed over a command line shell via Android Debug
Bridge (ADB). Loadable kernel modules (LKM) can also be compiled for extending the
kernel without recompiling. Modules operate within kernel space allowing a degree of
control over the operating system. Therefore, they can be used to deliver rootkit code that
can hide an intrusion in the operating system.
4.2.1

System Call Hook Development
System call hooking can be used to modify control flow of a system call in an

operating system by employing an intercepting handler function. This technique is
commonly installed via LKMs because the modules give direct control over memory in
kernel space. This software is commonly referred to as a rootkit with the objective of
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hiding and maintaining privileged access to a system. To understand how this is
implemented, this section will inspect targeting and hooking individual system calls.
One of the goals of a rootkit is to hide from the user without disrupting the
execution flow of the operating system. However, in most cases, one cannot know which
code is being executed by a process unless it is open source. The simplest way to
determine which system calls are invoked by the process is the strace command. The
strace command intercepts and records the system calls used by a specified process and
the signals (or return values) received by that process [Cla05]. For instance, an attacker
wants to hide a file in the directory from the ls command. A report of the system calls for
the ls command can be generated using the command ‘strace –o ls.out ls’. The grep
command can then search the output for the directory of the intended hidden file to
identify that the open() operates on the directory. By targeting that open() in the output, it
can be seen that the getdents64() is invoked with the pointer returned by open() as seen in
Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Opening the directory of the intended hidden file

The sequence of system calls reveals that getdents64() is the pivotal function to
the execution of ls and should be the target of the rootkit. Note that the grep command
may not always be available on the Android image. BusyBox, a toolkit of common UNIX
utilities optimized for embedded systems, can be installed on the system to access the
missing tool [Vla12].
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To intercept the execution of the system call, a new function needs to be inserted
in place of the targeted system call table entry. The system call table can be modified by
code delivered by LKM. Prior to 2.5 Linux kernels, the system call table structure
(sys_call_table) was exported to the entire kernel memory space. This new feature is an
obstacle since Android runs on 2.6 or higher Linux kernels. However, there are other
ways to determine the address of system call table. The first method brute forces the
address by starting at a location in kernel space and incrementing the address [Cla05].
After each increment, the address is compared to the known locations of exported system
calls, such as sys_read() and sys_write(), to determine the actual system call table
location. The second, simpler way is by searching (using the grep utility) for
‘sys_call_table’ against the System.map file or, if that is unavailable, /proc/kallsyms on
the Android image.
Once the system call table address is determined, it is simple to change the system
call table entry to the location of a new handler function. The system call table entry is
changed when the LKM is loaded using the insmod command. Figure 4.2 contains code
that saves the original address of the open() and getdents64() system call table entries and
changes them to new function handlers prefixed with “hooked_”.

Figure 4.2 System Call Hook LKM Initialization
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In Figure 4.2, the symbol representing the offset of the system call found in
unistd.h header (AOSP: kernel/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h) refers to the system call
table entry. That entry is saved into a global variable and replaced with a new handler
function defined in the LKM. The new handler function is called instead of the original
system call when it is invoked. Therefore, the handler function must match the
declaration of the original function to handle the intercepted parameters properly. The
system call table entries can be restored by assigning the saved original addresses.
Restoring the system call table to its original state is typically performed when the
module is removed with the rmmod command.
This method of targeting system calls and writing functions to alter the return
values of system calls can also be used to hide files, processes, ports and modules. The
next section describes the implementations of the LKM rootkits that hide these targets.
The full source code implementation and description can be obtained available from Dr.
Rusty O. Baldwin at the Air Force Institute of Technology (rusty.baldwin@afit.edu).
4.2.2

Hiding a File or Directory with hide_file.ko
The hide_file.ko rootkit hooks the system calls lstat64(), open(), and getdents64()

to hide files or directories that are named with a specified substring. The new lstat64()
handler function simply checks if the path contains the hidden file constant string. If the
string is present, the system call returns a “No such file or directory” signal. Otherwise,
the original lstat64() returns. The new open() handler function compares the inode of a
specified path to hide and the inode of the requested file path to open. If the two inodes
are equal, open() returns “No such file or directory” signal. Otherwise, the original open()
is returned. The new getdents64() handler function calls the original system call and
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copies the returned dirent buffer into kernel space and then iterates through the entries. If
an entry contains the specified substring of the intended hidden file, the entry is removed
from the buffer and size are changed to reflect the removal. The buffer is then copied
back to user space and the size is returned. All these operations hide the files or
directories so that the infection is covert from probe-based detection methods.
4.2.3

Hiding a Process with hide_proc.ko
The hide_proc.ko rootkit hides processes that are named with a specified

substring by hooking the system calls getdents64() and kill(). The new getdents64()
handler function calls the original system call and copies the returned dirent buffer into
kernel space and then iterates through the entries. The PID (process id) of the iterated
entry is compared to every running task. Once the matching running task is found, the
task name is extracted and compared to the specified substring. The matching record is
removed from the buffer and size is changed to reflect the removal. The buffer then is
copied back to user space and the size is returned. The new kill() handler function
compares the passed PID value to every running process to extract the name of the task.
If the task name contains the specified substring, the function returns a “No process or
process group can be found corresponding to that specified by PID” signal. Otherwise,
the original kill() system call returns. All these operations hide processes so that the
infection is covert from probe-based detection methods.
4.2.4

Hiding a Module with hide_mod.ko
The hide_mod.ko rootkit hides modules that are named with a specified substring

by hooking the system calls delete_module() and read(). The new delete_module()
handler function simply checks if the module name passed to the function contains the
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specified substring. If the substring is present, a “No module by that name exists” signal
is returned. Otherwise, the original delete_module() system call returns. The new read()
handler function calls the original read to obtain the buffer that will be returned to the
user. The function then determines the inode of the current open file and compares that
inode to the /proc/modules inode obtained when the module was loaded. If the inodes
match and the current running task is lsmod or cat, the buffer is examined. Since the
structure of the data in /proc/modules is consistent, the data in the buffer can be modified
to make a search easier. Each new line is first changed to a terminating null. This
technique allows the code to iterate through the data like an array of character strings. If
one of those strings contains the substring of the intended hidden module, the string is
removed from the buffer and the size is changed to reflect the removal. The newlines are
inserted back into the null terminator positions after iterating through the buffer. The
buffer is then copied back to user space and the size is returned. All these operations hide
modules so that the infection is covert from probe-based detection methods.
4.2.5

Hiding a Port with hide_port.ko
The hide_port.ko rootkit hooks the read() system call to hide a specified port

number. /proc/net/tcp6 is targeted because the open backdoor connection is created over
an IPv6 TCP port. The new read() handler function calls the original read to obtain the
data that will be returned to the user. The function determines the inode of the current
open file and compares that inode to the /proc/net/tcp6 inode obtained when the module
was loaded. If the inodes match and the current running task is netstat or cat, the buffer is
examined. Since the structure of the data in /proc/net/tcp6 is consistent, the data in the
buffer can be modified to make a search easier. Each new line is first changed to a
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terminating null. This technique allows the code to iterate through the data like an array
of character strings. The first string is skipped because that is the line containing the
column headers for the data. Each line after that begins with a line number beginning at
line 0. The line number and local port number are extracted from each string. If the local
port number matches the intended hidden port, the string is removed from the data and
the size is changed to reflect the removal. The iteration then begins from the beginning of
the data again and corrects the line number if the cat command is used on /proc/net/tcp6.
Once the data has been iterated through without any removals, the newlines are inserted
back into the null terminator positions. The buffer is then copied back to user space and
the size is returned. All these operations hide ports so that the infection is covert from
probe-based detection methods.

4.3

Rootkit Evaluation by Detection
The detectability of the covert Android rootkits effectiveness is determined by its

effectiveness in hiding the presence of infection data from different detection methods.
The covert techniques used are hide files, hide open ports, hide processes, and hide
modules.
Two metrics measure the effectiveness of rootkits’ stealth on both the emulator
and device. The first metric is detection to determine the detectability by traditional
detection methods. Four scans using methods discussed in Chapter 3 are used for this
metric. The scans are probe-based, integrity-based, signature-based, and heuristic-based
method detection. A successful detection by any of these scans is indicated by a “yes”
and an infection not detected is indicated by a “no”.
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The second metric is system behavior when rootkits are present (infected) and not
present (clean). The system call hook is intercepting the system call and running more
instructions before returning. It is likely that this adds a delay to the execution of the
system call. These delays, also described in Appendix A.5, are measured using the strace
tool.

4.4

Detection Method Testing Results
Table 4.1 contains the detection method testing results for each of the covert

techniques tested on the emulator. The first column lists the configurations tested and
each row represents a covert technique implemented in its respective rootkit. The
remaining columns to the right indicate the type of detection method tool used against
each covert technique rootkit. Probe-based and signature-based did not detect the rootkit
infection and thereby did not limit the effectiveness of the rootkits. These results were
expected because the rootkits were designed for commands used in the probe-based
detection. Signature-based detection methods failed because they only search application
folders, SD card files, SMS and contacts. Root privileges cannot be provided to the
scanner to search for infections in the system area and the implemented covert techniques
rootkits have not been publicly released. The Integrity-based scanner detected 100% of
the covert technique rootkits; however, it is dependent on having a trusted source to find
infections. The heuristic-based scanner limits the effectiveness of each rootkit
configuration except hide_file. The results are not surprising because the tools used to
determine an infection for a heuristic scan perform exhaustive collection of system data.
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Table 4.1 Emulator Rootkit Detection
Configuration
hide_file
hide_proc
hide_mod
hide_port

Probe
no
no
no
no

Detection Method
Integrity Signature Hueristic
yes
no
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes

The detection method results for each of the covert techniques tested on the
device are shown in Table 4.2. The results are similar to the emulator except for the
Lookout Security & Antivirus scan against the hide_proc rootkit and the infection data
not being detected by the heuristic scanner for the hide_mod rootkit. The freezing during
Lookout Security & Antivirus is because the hide_proc rootkit must have unintentionally
corrupted the execution of the application. Although this is not helpful for the test results,
such a crash could lead a user to wipe the phone to fix the unintended behavior. The wipe
would remove the rootkit infection and lead to an ineffective infection. The heuristic scan
was not able to find the hidden module on the device because the buffer from the
/proc/modules read() system call is constructed differently than that on the emulator.
Overall, the integrity and heuristic-based detection methods best limit the effectiveness of
the covert rootkits.
Table 4.2 Device Rootkit Detection
Configuration
hide_file
hide_proc
hide_mod
hide_port

Probe
no
no
no
no

Detection Method
Integrity Signature
yes
no
yes
no*
yes
no
yes
no

Hueristic
no
yes
no
yes

* phone became unresponsive when starting app and rebooted if the
rootkit was removed via ADB
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4.5

Behavior Latency Benchmark Results
The measurements of the system call completion times with the rootkit installed

(infected) and not installed (clean) on the tested emulator are shown in Table 4.3. The
system calls targeted by the rootkit are the only ones timed since the others will not be
affected by the system call hooking. The table is organized by the specific test
configurations: type of the intended target, the rootkit infection, and the system calls
being measured. The clean latencies are placed above the infected latencies to make it
easy to compare and do not illustrate the order in which the data was collected. The
system call completion times measured five times and the sample mean are listed to the
right of each test configuration. All the clean latency means were less than infected
except the lstat64() system call.
Table 4.3 Emulator System Call Latencies (in microseconds)
Target

file

proc

mod

port

Rootkit
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_proc
none
hide_proc
none
hide_mod
none
hide_mod
none
hide_port

System Call
getdents64
getdents64
lstat64
lstat64
open
open
getdents64
getdents64
kill
kill
delete_module
delete_module
read
read
read
read

Run 1
350
511
167
108
232
190
1093
1788
109
180
142
207
151
255
15597
18762

Run 2
435
434
232
147
167
257
1310
1314
132
162
131
201
147
215
17248
18492

Run 3
362
392
187
125
215
203
1193
1370
106
176
113
194
157
226
17013
18054

Run 4
412
479
202
173
174
243
1387
1400
124
156
126
212
148
221
17960
17064

Run 5
483
458
155
167
163
233
1107
1625
131
173
112
188
153
268
16536
17666

Mean
408.4
454.8
188.6
144
190.2
225.2
1218
1499.4
120.4
169.4
124.8
200.4
151.2
237
16870.8
18007.6

The time elapsed is calculated from the difference between the beginning and the
end wall-clock timestamps. If the process executing the system call is preempted by the
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scheduler for a longer than average time, the elapsed time can be quite large. For
example, Run 5 of clean getdents64() had a large outlier of 2602 microseconds which put
the average latency for the test configuration at 832 microseconds. This latency is 313%
higher than the average latency indicating it was preempted longer than the other runs. It
is also well past the 1.5 IQR from the second quartile, a further indication that it is indeed
an outlier. Therefore, it was replaced by collecting a new latency using the command
from the Perl script. There were 6 outliers total in the data collected from the emulator.
These were all handled the same way.
Figure 4.3 is a box plot comparing the clean verses infected system call
completion times on the emulator. As seen in the collected data and calculated means, the
infected getdents64() and open() system calls for hide_file tend to take longer to
complete than the clean system call while lstat64() opposes that trend. Box plots for all
the clean verses infected system call completion times for the tested emulator are
available in Appendix B.

Figure 4.3 Emulator hide_file System Call Latencies Box Plots
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Table 4.4 shows the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for
the results from the emulator. The table is organized by the specific test configurations:
type of the intended target, the rootkit infection, and the system calls being measured.
The clean CI are placed above the infected CI to make it easy to compare but do not
indicate the order the data was collected. The true population mean is 95% certain to lie
between the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval for each test
configuration. As seen previously, the confidence intervals trend higher for infected
system call completion times except, again, for lstat64().
Table 4.4 Emulator System Call Latency 95% t-Confidence Interval Bounds (in microseconds)
Target

file

proc

mod

port

Rootkit
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_proc
none
hide_proc
none
hide_mod
none
hide_mod
none
hide_port

System Call
getdents64
getdents64
lstat64
lstat64
open
open
getdents64
getdents64
kill
kill
delete_module
delete_module
read
read
read
read

Lower
340.820
398.819
151.035
109.792
151.415
190.518
1058.994
1251.018
105.228
156.934
109.109
188.407
146.202
208.240
15780.623
17171.667

Mean
408.4
454.8
188.6
144
190.2
225.2
1218
1499.4
120.4
169.4
124.8
200.4
151.2
237
16870.8
18007.6

Upper
475.980
510.781
226.165
178.208
228.985
259.882
1377.006
1747.782
135.572
181.866
140.491
212.393
156.198
265.760
17960.977
18843.533

Table 4.5 shows the results of a single-sided t-test to determine if the difference in
the means of the clean verses infected system calls on the emulator. The left column is
the target while the remaining right columns are the system calls affected by each rootkit.
The null hypothesis is that the clean was less than the infected system call. As expected,
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all the system calls except lstat64() were statistically significant meaning that the means
of the clean latencies were less than the infected latencies. The clean lstat64() system call
was greater than the infected. The actual function invoked by that system call is inspected
to determine what causes this difference.
Table 4.5 Emulator Clean vs. Infected System Call Completion Times
Target
files
procs
modules
ports

open()
LESS
-

lstat64()
GREATER
-

System Call
getdents64() kill()
LESS
LESS
LESS
-

delete_module()
LESS
-

read()
LESS
LESS

Table 4.6 shows the difference between the means of the clean and infected
system call latencies on the emulator. All show an increase in the infected system call
completion times except lstat64() under hide_file. This exception can be attributed to the
short amount of code the hooked function runs. In the source code in
/kernel/common/fs/stat.c, lstat64() executes more code since it handles more initializing
and flag checking. Although, hooking lstat64() results in a shorter execution time, the
existence of the difference in means indicates that an infection can still be detected by a
specially designed algorithm. Since all the differences are less than 0.1 second (or
100,000 microseconds), the threshold proposed by Nielsen for a user to notice a
difference in system performance [Nie93], the latency induced by the covert technique
would likely remained unnoticed by the average user.
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Table 4.6 Emulator Behavior Difference in Latency Means (in microseconds)
Rootkit
hide_file
hide_proc
hide_mod
hide_port

System Call
getdents64
lstat64
open
getdents64
kill
delete_module
read
read

Clean Mean
Latency
408.4
188.6
190.2
1218
120.4
124.8
151.2
16870.8

Infected Mean
Latency
454.8
144
225.2
1499.4
169.4
200.4
237
18007.6

Difference in
Latency Means
46.4
-44.6
35
281.4
49
75.6
85.8
1136.8

Table 4.7 lists the measurement of the system call completion times with the
rootkit installed (infected) and not installed (clean) on the device tested, Samsung Galaxy
Nexus. The table is organized identically to the emulator data in Table 4.3. The
measurements were taken on the device to show the real-world performance of the covert
technique rootkits. The latencies measured for the device do not reflect the same range or
magnitude as the emulator. However, the difference in means caused by the additional
instructions added by the system call hook is evident as it was on the emulator.
Table 4.7 Device Behavior Latency Data (in microseconds)
Target

file

proc

mod

port

Rootkit
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_proc
none
hide_proc
none
hide_mod
none
hide_mod
none
hide_port

System Call
getdents64
getdents64
lstat64
lstat64
open
open
getdents64
getdents64
kill
kill
delete_module
delete_module
read
read
read
read

Run 1
2346
2319
274
152
396
763
672
1373
30
152
91
152
91
244
946
2258

Run 2
2503
2382
428
184
214
793
701
1402
31
183
61
183
61
275
976
2289
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Run 3
2165
2442
305
214
244
824
763
1465
61
213
31
214
31
335
1007
2319

Run 4
2471
2563
335
244
275
916
793
1494
91
244
30
244
30
306
1037
2350

Run 5
2230
2748
458
275
305
1099
824
1556
92
274
92
275
92
336
1068
2411

Mean
2343
2490.8
360
213.8
286.8
879
750.6
1458
61
213.2
61
213.6
61
299.2
1006.8
2325.4

The measured system call completion times also suffered from outliers. As with
the emulator, outliers were replaced by collecting a new latency measurement using the
specific command from the Perl script. There were 4 outliers total in the data collected
from the device. These were handled the same way as described when replacing outliers
with the emulator data.
Figure 4.4 shows a box plot that illustrates the comparison for the clean verses
infected system call completion times on the tested device. As expected, the infected
getdents64() is shown to tend to take longer to complete the clean system call. Box plots
for all the clean verses infected system call completion times on the tested device are
available in Appendix B.
Device: hide_file
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Figure 4.4 Device hide_file System Call Latencies Box Plots

Table 4.8 shows the upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals on
the tested device. The table is organized identically to the emulator data in Table 4.4. The
true population mean is 95% certain to lie between the upper and lower bounds of the
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confidence interval for each test configuration. Again, all the clean latency means were
less than infected except for the lstat64() system call.
Table 4.8 Device Behavior Latency 95% t-Confidence Interval Bounds (in microseconds)
Target

file

proc

mod

port

Rootkit
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_file
none
hide_proc
none
hide_proc
none
hide_mod
none
hide_mod
none
hide_port

System Call
getdents64
getdents64
lstat64
lstat64
open
open
getdents64
getdents64
kill
kill
delete_module
delete_module
read
read
read
read

Lower
2160.465
2280.175
261.301
153.721
200.046
710.520
672.126
1367.371
23.124
153.320
23.124
153.327
23.124
249.865
946.920
2252.360

Mean
2343
2490.8
360
213.8
286.8
879
750.6
1458
61
213.2
61
213.6
61
299.2
1006.8
2325.4

Upper
2525.535
2701.425
458.699
273.879
373.554
1047.480
829.074
1548.629
98.876
273.080
98.876
273.873
98.876
348.535
1066.680
2398.440

Table 4.9 shows the results of a single-sided t-test to determine if the difference in
the means of the clean verses infected system calls on the tested device. The table is
organized identically to the emulator data in Table 4.5. The null hypothesis tested that the
clean was again less than the infected system call. As expected, all the system calls
except lstat64() were statistically significant meaning that the means of the clean
latencies were less than the infected latencies. The clean lstat64() system call was again
determined to be greater than the infected.
Table 4.9 Device Clean vs. Infected System Call Completion Times
Target
files
procs
modules
ports

open()
LESS
-

lstat64()
GREATER
-

System Call
getdents64() kill()
LESS
LESS
LESS
-
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delete_module()
LESS
-

read()
LESS
LESS

Table 4.10 shows the difference between the means of the clean and infected
system call latencies. The table is organized identically to the emulator data in Table 4.6.
As seen on the tested emulator, all the cases show an increase in the infected system call
completion times except lstat64() under hide_file. This exception is attributed to the short
amount of code the new handler function runs compared to the original system call as
explained previously on the emulator. As before, the existence of the difference in means
indicates that an infection can still be detected by an algorithm but may be unnoticed by a
user because the differences are less than 0.1 second.
Table 4.10 Device Behavior Difference in Latency Means (in microseconds)
Rootkit
hide_file
hide_proc
hide_mod
hide_port

4.6

System Call
getdents64
lstat64
open
getdents64
kill
delete_module
read
read

Clean Mean
Latency
2343
360
286.8
750.6
61
61
61
1006.8

Infected Mean
Latency
2490.8
213.8
879
1458
213.2
213.6
299.2
2325.4

Difference in
Latency Means
147.8
-146.2
592.2
707.4
152.2
152.6
238.2
1318.6

Summary
This chapter presents the evaluation technique used to determine the effectiveness

of the rootkits. The results of the covert techniques tested against detection methods are
presented and statistical analysis is performed on the data provided for the behavioralbased detection. Both the evaluations were performed on the emulator and Samsung
Galaxy Nexus device.
The results of the detection method testing showed that while conventional probebased and signature based-detection did not limit the effectiveness of the tested rootkits,
integrity-based and heuristic-based were able to detect the presence of an infection
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thereby limiting the stealth and the effectiveness of the rootkit. The results of behavior
latency benchmark showed that the difference in means is statistically significant and
could be used as a basis for detecting system call hooking rootkit infections. As expected,
the results were similar for both the emulator and the device. Chapter V addresses
accomplishments of this research and proposes future work for kernel level rootkit design
and detection on Android.
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V. Conclusions
5.1

Research Accomplishments
This research defined software attacks from a technical perspective, designed

kernel level rootkits with covert functionality on Android mobile devices, and evaluated
the effectiveness of the rootkits by scanning an infected system with detection methods
and benchmarking the behavior of the covert techniques used.
A mobile device, such as a Smartphone, can carry multiple connections from
cellular networks, wireless Bluetooth, the Internet (via Wi-Fi), USB and other
peripherals. Smartphone users can access email, social networks, and banking, all from
their mobile device. Information security becomes an immediate concern with this
amount of sensitive data being handled on these potentially unsecured devices. This
research demonstrates that the Android software stack is not robust enough to be fully
trusted since the kernel can be directly manipulated to hide an attacker’s presence. The
kernel level rootkits tested against detection methods were designed for the Linux kernel
used by the latest release, Android 4.0 Ice Cream Sandwich. These rootkits focused on
covert techniques to hide the presence of data used by an attacker to infect a mobile
device. Detection methods were used to measure the effectiveness of the kernel level
rootkits. The effect of hooking system calls have on performance behavior was analyzed
in depth.
A rootkit is most effective when its presence cannot be detected. The most
popular free Antivirus, Lookout Security & Antivirus, and the built-in system commands
for Android were not able to detect the presence of an infection hidden by the covert
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rootkits. The Lookout Security & Antivirus has signatures for attacks that take advantage
of the native Linux kernel but are ineffective since they only look for a signature of the
data unpacked on to the device from the application.
Integrity-based detection methods were 100% effective against the covert
techniques but rely on installing prior to the infection or have a trusted source. Heuristicbased detection also shows signs of weakening the effectiveness of the kernel level
rootkits. However, the strace command can be used to target the processes of both these
methods to implement new hooks to block detection.
The behavioral-based detection method analysis showed that the rootkits tested
can have a noticeable impact on the latency of a system call completion time. The
magnitude is too small for a user to notice but the differences could be discovered by
another algorithm. However, this method again requires an uncompromised state to
identify anomalies [Sha12].

5.2

Research Impact
Rootkits are a real threat on mobile devices, especially ones that use the Android

platform. While the installation method used to test this requires a custom setup not
common to all phones, it may be possible to exploit and install this rootkit using exploits
[Ces98]. Keeping the device updated also might not be possible because of fragmentation
in Android, therefore, the user is left to depend on the manufacturer for security. This
security model is unsustainable and more research into Android rootkits and detection
needs to be performed because the problem is only going to get worse.
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5.3

Future Research Areas
Kernel level rootkits are a real threat on the Android operating system even

though as yet there are not many reported cases. Sophisticated attackers can use rootkits
to maintain long periods of undetected presence on an Android mobile device. The proof
of concept rootkits and the detection methods presented can be extended for new research
in both attack and defense.
Integrity and heuristic detection methods limited the effectiveness of the kernel
level rootkits during testing. The rootkit could be more effective by evading integrity
detection using techniques presented in [You11] and [You12] since the system call table
structure is not directly modified. Heuristic detection can be evaded by designing the
covert technique to thwart detection tools like unhide-tcp and skdet. Research into
exploring different kernel level rootkits is always expanding and designing rootkits for
the post-PC era devices should not be ignored.
Behavioral detection also limited a rootkit’s covert effectiveness by detecting
differences in the mean of the system call latencies. However, its reliance on having an
uncompromised state to compare the measured latencies needs to be removed.
Algorithms designed to monitor system behavior for performance anomalies should be
investigated further. This additional detection measure could increase the effectiveness of
an IDS for Android or other operating systems.
Beyond the stealth and detection, research methods to hook into the Android
framework from the kernel level rootkit should be developed. Although the personal data
such as contacts, text messages, and application data can be found by searching known
locations, new ways of getting to this data in a more abstract and Android framework
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friendly way would make data exfiltration and remote control of an Android mobile
device much easier. Removing the need to reverse engineer a target application for that
application’s data would have a long lasting impact on the security research for Android.
The rootkits were designed for the Android operating system but should also be
easily portable by compiling for a targeted Linux kernel. As Android and Linux continue
to be used across more devices and platforms, the need for security research increases
since the inherent vulnerabilities are not going away. The success of implementing a
kernel level rootkit in a mobile device environment demonstrates that additional security
measures should be implemented on Android and its Linux kernel.
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Appendix A. Detection Method Implementations
This appendix contains the detection method implementations including
description and scripts.

A.1

Probe-based Detection
Probe-based detection identifies signs of infection by forensic analysis using the

system commands: ls, cat, ps, kill, lsmod, and rmmod. The function of the system
commands are described below:

•

List Files (ls) – lists the files in a current or specified directory.

•

Catenate File (cat) – writes the contents of each file specified in the standard
output.

•

List Processes (ps) – lists the processes currently running.

•

Kill Process (kill) – sends a signal to a process. The default signal sent is the
termination signal but the command can also send other specified signals. This
extra functionality is not used in this research.

•

List Modules (lsmod) – lists the modules currently installed.

•

Remove Module (rmmod) – removes a specified module.

•

List Network Connections (netstat) – lists all incoming and outgoing network
connections, routing tables, and network interface statistics.

Table A.1 is a list of the system commands used to search for infection traces
during probe-based detection.
Table A.1 Probe-based Detection Method Commands
Infection Traces
Files
Processes
Modules
Ports

System Commands Used
ls, ls <filename>, ls –l, ls –l <filename>, cat <filename>
ps, ps <process_name>, ls /proc/, kill <pid>
lsmod, cat /proc/modules, rmmod <module_name>
netstat, cat /proc/net/tcp6
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A.2

Signature-based Detection
The signature-based malware detection tool Lookout Security & Antivirus

[Loo12] is scanned against each covert technique on both Android platforms. Anti-virus
(AV) tools like Lookout Security & Antivirus are ineffective in detecting all attacks
because they typically only scan application folders, SD card files, SMS and contacts
[Far11]. Since a typical Android device does not have root privileges by default, the AV
applications cannot search for infections in the system area that is the most targeted and
vulnerable.
The Lookout Security & Antivirus application is available in the Google Play
Store. The application was downloaded from the Google Play Store on another device
and the .apk installer file was copied using Astro File Manager [Gop12] from that device.
The .apk is then installed over the ADB with the command ‘adb install Lookout70800.apk’ [God12]. The security scan was then initialized when running Lookout
Security & Antivirus. Figure A.1 shows the interface of Astro File Manager and Lookout
Security & Antivirus.

Figure A.1 Astro File Manager Backup, Lookout Security & Antivirus Menu
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A.3

Integrity-based Detection
Rootkits often take control over of a kernel by modifying static system structures.

Integrity-based detection compares data of a trusted source with potentially infected data
to find differences that identify a possible attack. In the case of the system call hooking
technique, used by the rootkits in this research, the rootkit overwrites the address of the
system call table entry so that the malicious code in a new handler function is executed.
The addresses in the system call entries are supposed to be permanent and should not
change even after a reboot of the operating system. Therefore, the system structures need
to be validated in a trusted state before searching for changes from an attacker. The
trusted source for a system call table can be found in the System.map file if it is available.
Android devices typically do not have the System.map file available. Therefore,
the addresses of the system call table entries can be determined by scanning kernel
memory using an LKM [Bur10]. The system call table address can be found the same
way as described in Section 4.2.1. When the LKM is installed, each system call table
entry is saved into a copy array. Upon removal of the LKM, each system call table entry
is compared to the copy array. A detection message prints to the message buffer of the
kernel if a difference is found and can be read using the dmesg command.
During testing, the LKM used to test integrity was named scprint. The scprint
module was compiled for the specific kernel being tested, the same as the rootkits. Prior
to the rootkit infection, scprint was installed. This way the system call table is in a trusted
state. The specific covert technique rootkit is installed which hooks its respective system
calls. The scprint module is then uninstalled and the proper detection messages are
printed to the message buffer of the kernel. The process of downloading, installing, and
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uninstalling the scprint module was automated using a Perl script named integrity.pl.
Figure A.2 shows a successful detection by the integrity-based detection.

Figure A.2 Integrity Check Output Pre and Post Infection

The code for integrity.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android System Call Table Inegrity Check
# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
print "Android Integrity Check (AIC) over ADB \n";
my $lsmod_out = `adb shell lsmod`;
if ($lsmod_out =~ /scprint/)
{
print "Found scprint! Unistalling...\n";
`adb shell rmmod scprint`;
print "Collecting output...\n";
my $dmesg_out = `adb shell dmesg | tail -10`;
# print "Output:\n$dmesg_out\n";
my @detects = ($dmesg_out =~ /(DETECTION:(.)+)\n/g);
for($i = 0; $i < @detects; $i++)
{
print "$detects[$i]\n";
}
}
else
{
print "scprint.ko LKM must be installed prior to infection for this script to work
correctly.\n";
print "Pushing over ADB...";
`adb push ~/mods/scprint/scprint.ko /data/local/`;
print "Installing...\n";
`adb shell insmod /data/local/scprint.ko`;
print "Installed. Run check again after infection.\n";
}
############## EOF: integrity.pl ##############
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A.4

Heuristic-based
based Detection
Rootkits take control of execution flow to hide data; however, there are other

ways to find data that is hidden. Heuristic
Heuristic-based
based detection identifies anomalies
an
by
comparing the returned data from different functions targeting the same source. The
heuristic scan was designed custom for detecting the rootkits tested in this research. They
used a combination of tools created to detect Linux rootkits and commands
comm
already
available on the Android kernel. The heuristic scan searches for anomalies to identify
hidden files, processes, modules, and ports.
The heuristic scan is implemented by a Perl script that runs commands over ADB
and analyzes the output. The ana
analysis
lysis is printed to the terminal of the machine running
ADB. The heuristic scan starts by running unhide
unhide-tcp
tcp to find hidden ports. The Rootkit
Hunter Project [Boe12] uses unhide
unhide-tcp
tcp to enhance its detection capabilities. Unhide-TCP
Unhide
identifies TCP/UDP ports that are listening but not listed by the netstat command by
brute forcing all TCP/UDP ports available [http://sourceforge.net/projects/unhide/files/].
If any hidden ports are detected, the results are printed to the output. Figure A.3
A shows
the output when a hidden port is detected by unhide
unhide-tcp.

Figure A
A.3 Port Heuristic Detection Output
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The heuristic scanner identifies hidden processes by comparing the output of the
ps –T command and skdet tool. The ps –T command returns all the running task threads
on the device. The ps command from the BusyBox toolkit is used. Skdet is designed to
detect rootkits such as SucKIT, adore-ng, trojaned files, and more. The Rootkit Hunter
Project can also take advantage of skdet to enhance its detection capabilities. The
heuristic scanner uses skdet for an alternative source of running task threads by using the
–c option. The difference of the two sets of data PIDs is then printed out. The operator
running the heuristic scanner must have some extra knowledge to understand the printed
difference. Three of the processes are unique to the ps command and skdet tool because
of the shell over ADB. Therefore they can be ignored in the results. These processes
found during testing were sh (shell), adbd (ADB daemon), and the skdet tool. Figure A.4
shows the output of the heuristic scanner when a hidden process is detected
(hidemy_proc).

Figure A.4 Process Heuristic Detection Output

Hidden modules are identified by comparing the number of lines in the lsmod
command output verses the line count of /proc/modules. The lsmod command is built into
the Android Linux kernel but the wc command is found with the BusyBox toolkit. If the
line counts are not equal, the difference is printed out. The lsmod command is expected
to have the smaller amount of lines since it is the command targeted by the system call
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hook. Figure A.5 shows the output of the heuristic scanner when a hidden module is
detected.

Figure A
A.5 Module Heuristic Detection Output

Hidden files are identified by comparing the num
number
ber of lines in the ls command
output verses the number of lines in the output from ‘find <directory_name> -maxdepth
1’. The ls command is built into the Android Linux kernel but the find command is found
with the BusyBox toolkit. The ‘maxdepth’ option dic
dictates
tates the amount of levels to descend
from the directory specified in the command line arguments. One line is subtracted from
the results of the find command because it will include a line for the target directory. If
the line counts are not equal, the dif
difference
ference is printed out. The ls command is expected to
have the smaller amount of lines since it is the command targeted by the system call
hook. Figure A.6 shows the output of the heuristic scanner when a hidden file or
directory is detected.

Figure A
A.6 File/Directory Heuristic Detection Output

The code for heuristic.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android heuristic scanning
# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
print "Android Heuristic Scanner (AHS) over ADB \n\n";
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my $prog;
# HIDDEN PORT SCANNING ################
print "Scanning for hidden ports with Unhide-TCP...\n\n";
# RUN UNHIDE-TCP AND PRINT OUTPUT
$prog = "/data/local/unhide-tcp";
my $find_ports = `adb shell $prog`;
printf("%s\n", $find_ports);
# HIDDEN PROCESS SCANNING #############
print "Scanning for hidden processes...\n\n";
# GET ALL THREADS PIDS PROVIDED TO PS
$prog = "/data/local/busybox ps -T";
my $ps_out = `adb shell $prog`;
# remove first line
$ps_out = substr($ps_out, (index($ps_out,"\n")+1));
my @ps_pids = split /\s+[0-9]+\s+[0-9]+[:][0-9]+\s+.*\R/, $ps_out;
# trim whitespace
foreach (@ps_pids)
{
$_ =~ s/^\s+//;
$_ =~ s/\s+$//;
}
# for($i = 0; $i < 5; $i++)
# {
# printf ("ps[%i] = %s\n", $i, $ps_pids[$i]); #Prints ith first element
# }
# GET ALL THREADS PIDS ATTAINED BY SKDET
$prog = "/data/local/skdet -c";
my $skdet_out = `adb shell $prog`;
my @skdet_pids = split /\s+[\b]+\s.*\R/, $skdet_out;
my @skdet_pnames = split /.*[\b]+\s+/, $skdet_out;
chomp(@skdet_pnames);
# for($i = 0; $i < 5; $i++)
# {
# printf ("skdet[%i] = %s\t%s\n", $i,
# $skdet_pids[$i], $skdet_pnames[$i+1]); #Prints ith first element
# }
# GET THE DIFFERENCE OF THE TWO SETS
%ps_pids = map {$_=>1} @ps_pids;
my @absent_pids = grep(!defined $ps_pids{$_}, @skdet_pids);
# foreach(@absent_pids)
# {
# print $_."\n";
# }
# GET INDEX OF THREADS MISSING FROM PS
my @absent_index;
for($i = 0; $i < @absent_pids; $i++)
{
@absent_index[$i] = grep{ $skdet_pids[$_] == $absent_pids[$i]} 0 .. $#skdet_pids;
}
# PRINT OUT THE NAMES OF THE THREADS MISSING FROM PS
print "Threads missing from 'ps':\nPID\tNAME\n";
for($i = 0; $i < @absent_index; $i++)
{
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printf("%s\t%s\n",
$skdet_pnames[$absent_index[$i]+1]);
}
print "\n";

$skdet_pids[$absent_index[$i]],

# HIDDEN MODULE SCANNING ##############
print "Scanning for hidden modules...\n\n";
# GET LSMOD OUTPUT AND COUNT LINES
$prog = "lsmod";
my $lsmod_out = `adb shell $prog`;
my $lsmod_lines = $lsmod_out =~ tr/\n//;
# printf("lsmod = %i modules\n", $lsmod_lines);
# GET LINE COUNT FROM MODULES FILE
$prog = "/data/local/busybox wc -l /proc/modules";
my $wcl_out = `adb shell $prog`;
$wcl_out =~ s/[^0-9]//g;
# printf("wc -l = %i modules\n", $wcl_out);
# COMPARE VALUES
if($wcl_out != $lsmod_lines)
{
my $hidden_mods = $wcl_out - $lsmod_lines;
printf("There is %i hidden module/s present\n\n", $hidden_mods);
}
else
{
printf("There are no hidden modules present\n\n");
}
# HIDDEN FILE SCANNING ################
print "Scanning for hidden files...\n\n";
$prog = "ls /sdcard/ -a";
my $ls_out = `adb shell $prog`;
my $ls_lines = $ls_out =~ tr/\n//;
printf("ls = %i files/dirs\n", $ls_lines);
$prog = "/data/local/busybox find /sdcard/ -maxdepth 1";
my $find_out = `adb shell $prog`;
my $find_lines = $find_out =~ tr/\n//;
$find_lines--; # for the parent dir
printf("find = %i files/dirs\n", $find_lines);
if($find_lines != $ls_lines)
{
my $hidden_files = $find_lines - $ls_lines;
printf("There is %i hidden file/s present\n\n", $hidden_files);
}
else
{
printf("There are no hidden files present\n\n");
}
# COMPLETE ############################
print "Android Heuristic Scan Complete!\n"
############## EOF: heuristic.pl ##############
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A.5

Behavioral-based Detection
Behavioral-based detection deduces a rootkit infection by monitoring kernel level

execution to identify anomalies in performance. A rootkit employing system call hooking
can potentially add a delay to a system call to complete execution because the additional
hook code is executed before returning to the user space program. This delay is the most
noticeable to the end user because slow execution hinders productivity. The annoyance
caused by the delay may lead the user to wipe the mobile device regardless if there is a
rootkit presence detected.
Behavioral-based detection measures latencies of uninfected or clean and infected
system calls using the strace command. The system calls measured are only those that
have their execution intercepted by a system call. Table A.2 lists these infected system
calls for each rootkit. Each rootkit has a Perl script that captures the system call
completion time of the target strace output. These scripts are named sc_file.pl, sc_proc.pl,
sc_mod.pl, and sc_port.pl.
Table A.2 System Calls Infected by Rootkit
Rootkit
hide_file.ko
hide_proc.ko
hide_mod.ko
hide_port.ko

Infected System Calls
getdents64(), lstat64(), open()
getdents64(), kill()
read(), delete_module()
read()

The strace command shows the time spent in system calls when the –T option is
set as an argument to the command. The time elapsed is calculated from the difference
between the beginning and the end wall-clock timestamps. The –e option is set to print
only relevant system calls by using the expression “trace=”. Following the strace
command and options, the actual targeted process command is stated. These commands
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were chosen as direct targets of the rootkit and the most straightforward output to parse
with the Perl script. Table A.3 lists all the strace commands used by the Perl scripts.
Table A.3 strace Commands Used to Measure System Call Completions
Rootkit
hide_file.ko
hide_file.ko
hide_file.ko
hide_proc.ko
hide_proc.ko
hide_mod.ko
hide_mod.ko
hide_port.ko

Measured System Call
getdents64()
lstat64()
open()
getdents64()
kill()
read()
delete_module()
read()

strace Command
strace -T -e trace=getdents64 ls -a /sdcard/
strace -T -e trace=lstat64 ls -l /sdcard/hidemy.txt
strace -T -e trace=open cat /sdcard/hidemy.txt
strace -T -e trace=getdents64 ps hidemy_proc
strace -T -e trace=kill kill <PID>
strace -T -e trace=read lsmod
strace -T -e trace=delete_module rmmod hidemy_mod
strace -T -e trace=open,read netstat

The code for sc_file.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android system call traces for hide_file.ko
# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
# open output file
$fout = "strace_file.txt";
open(OUT, ">>$fout") || die("This file will not open!\n");

print OUT "Run\tgetdents64\tlstat64\topen\n";
for($i = 0; $i < 5; )
{
$i++;
print OUT "$i\t";
# ls -a <dir of hidden file> system call times
my $lsa_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace
/sdcard/`;
# print OUT "$lsa_out\n";
my @lsa_times = ($lsa_out =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/g);
# print "getdents64($i): @lsa_times\n";
# sum getdents calls
$getdents_total = 0;
$getdents_total += $_ for @lsa_times;
printf(OUT "%f\t", $getdents_total);
# ls -l <dir of hidden file> system call times
my $lsl_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace
/sdcard/hidemy.txt`;
# print OUT "$lsl_out\n";
my @lsl_times = ($lsl_out =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/g);
# print "lstat64($i): @lsl_times\n";
# sum lstat calls
$lstat_total = 0;
$lstat_total += $_ for @lsl_times;
printf OUT "%f\t", $lstat_total;
# cat <hidden file> system call times
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-T

-T

-e

trace=getdents64

-e

trace=lstat64

ls

-a

ls

-l

# print OUT "STRACE OUTPUT FOR 'cat'\n";
my
$cat_out
=
`adb
shell
/data/local/strace
-T
/sdcard/hidemy.txt`;
# print OUT "$cat_out\n";
$cat_out =~ /open\("\/sdcard\/hidemy.txt".+<(\d+.\d+)>/;
printf OUT "%f\n", $1;

-e

trace=open

sleep(1);
}
close OUT;
############## EOF: sc_file.pl ##############

The code for sc_proc.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android system call traces for hide_proc.ko
# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
# open output file
$fout = "strace_file.txt";
open(OUT, ">>$fout") || die("This file will not open!\n");
# ps <proc name> system call times
my $ps_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace -T -e trace=getdents64 ps hidemy_proc`;
# print "$ps_out\n";
my @ps_times = ($ps_out =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/g);
#print "@ps_times\n";
$getdents_total = 0;
$getdents_total += $_ for @ps_times;
printf(OUT "%f\t", $getdents_total);
# use skdet to get pid
my $skdet_out = `adb shell /data/local/skdet -c`;
# print "$skdet_out\n";
# get thread names and pids
my @skdet_pids = split /\s+[\b]+\s.*\R/, $skdet_out;
my @skdet_pnames = split /.*[\b]+\s+/, $skdet_out;
chomp(@skdet_pnames);
# remove carriage return
foreach(@skdet_pnames)
{
$_=~ s/\r|\n//g;
# remove /r or /n
#$_ =~ s/(.)/sprintf("%x",ord($1))/eg;
# print "$_\n";
# print "$string\n";
}
# get pid of hidden proc
my $pid = -1;
for($i = 0; $i <@skdet_pnames; $i++)
{
# print "$string = $skdet_pnames[$i]\n"; #Prints ith first element
if("hidemy_proc" eq $skdet_pnames[$i] )
{
$pid = $skdet_pids[$i - 1];
last;
}
}
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cat

# kill <pid> system call times
if ($pid > 0)
{
# $pid = $skdet_pids[$found_index-1];
my $kill_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace -T -e trace=kill kill $pid`;
# print "$kill_out\n";
$kill_out =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/;
printf OUT "%f\n", $1;
}
else
{
print "Could not test kill()\n";
}
close OUT;
############## EOF: sc_proc.pl ##############

The code for sc_mod.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android system call traces for hide_mod.ko
# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
# open output file
$fout = "strace_file.txt";
open(OUT, ">>$fout") || die("This file will not open!\n");
print OUT "Run\tread\tdelete_module\n";
for($i = 0; $i < 5; )
{
$i++;
print OUT "$i\t";
# lsmod system call times
my $lsmod_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace -T -e trace=read lsmod`;
# print "$lsmod_out\n";
# uncomment line below for clean: hello always first
#$lsmod_out =~ /read\(3, "hello.+<(\d+.\d+)>/;
# uncomment line below for infected: hide_mod always first
$lsmod_out =~ /read\(3, "hide_mod.+<(\d+.\d+)>/;
printf OUT "%f\t", $1;
# rmmod <hidden mod> system call times
my $rmmod_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace -T -e trace=delete_module rmmod
hidemy_mod`;
# print "$rmmod_out\n";
$rmmod_out =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/;
printf OUT "%f\n", $1;
}
close OUT;
############## EOF: sc_mod.pl ##############

The code for sc_port.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl -w
# Android system call traces for hide_port.ko
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# Bobby Brodbeck, AFIT, June 2012
use 5.10.0;
# open output file
$fout = "strace_file.txt";
open(OUT, ">>$fout") || die("This file will not open!\n");
print OUT "Run\tread\n";
for($i = 0; $i < 5; )
{
$i++;
print OUT "$i\t";
# netstat system call times
my $netstat_out = `adb shell /data/local/strace -T -e trace=open,read netstat`;
# print "$netstat_out\n\n";
# separate lines for parsing
@nslines = split(m/\R/,$netstat_out);
chomp(@nslines);
# find boundaries of read calls
my $start = 0;
my $end = scalar(@nslines);
my $tcp6_flag = 0;
for($j = 0; $j < $end; $j++)
{
# print "$j: $nslines[$j]\n";
if($nslines[$j] =~ /open\("\/proc\/net\/tcp6"/)
{
$start = $j+1;
$tcp6_flag = 1;
# stop looking for tcp6
}
if($tcp6_flag && $j > $start && ($nslines[$j] =~ /open/))
{
$end = $j;
# grab and go on
}
}

# collect read completion times
my @reads;
for($j = $start; $j < $end; $j++)
{
if($nslines[$j] =~ /<(\d+.\d+)>/g)
{
push(@reads, $1);
# print "$j: $nslines[$j]\n";
}
}
# sum completion times
# print "@reads\n";
my $read_total = 0;
$read_total += $_ for @reads;
printf(OUT "%f\n", $read_total);
}
close OUT;
############## EOF: sc_port.pl ##############
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Appendix B. System Call Latency Box Plots
This appendix contains all the clean verses infected system call latencies box plots
for the emulator and device. These box plots are discussed in detail in Section 4.5.

Figure B.1 Emulator: File System Call Latencies
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